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1. The debate on the future of the Con-
stitutional Treaty
 On 29 May 2005 French voters rejected 
the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in a national referendum. 
Three days later the Dutch did the same. Thus elector-
ates in two European Union founding states placed a ma-
jor question mark over the future of the Treaty which 
had been agreed by the leaders of 25 Member States 
and ceremonially signed by them in Rome seven months 
previously.
 For the first time in the history of the EU 
so many Member States had decided to ratify a com-
munity treaty through a national referendum. For 
the first time a community document had to win 
the approval of ordinary voters across Europe on a ma-
jor scale. It is worth noting that the CT was not writ-
ten with voters in mind. The authors were tasked with 
creating a legal framework within which the member 
states and the European institutions could work to-
gether in an enlarged European Union. Analysts have 
pointed out EU structures are rooted in diplomacy 
and not in politics. Treaty negotiations aim at bringing 
about an agreement between member state govern-
ments. They are not designed to build popular support 
for the texts of negotiated documents. It seems, how-
ever, that referenda have appeared on the EU scene for 
good and that this will in future fundamentally change 
the way in which treaty documents are prepared. 
 This is the basic issue which faces the EU 
at present. In the great majority of Member States 
the debate is not about the content of the CT. 
The debate is about how to win the support of the pub-
lic at large for the reforms in the CT in a democratic, 
credible and legitimate way. European leaders faced 
this challenge at the European Council in June 
2005 and they decided not to risk any further defeats 
for the CT. Instead they put off the decision on the fu-
ture of the CT and brought in a period of reflection 
which will last till June 2006.
 The result of the referendum in France 
and Holland begs the question of whether the CT 
will ever come into force. After all it has to be ratified 
by all the Member States. It is worth mentioning here 
that the 25 Member States have attached a declaration 
to the draft Treaty. This states that ‘if two years after 
the signature of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe, four fifths of the Member States have 
ratified it and one or more Member States have en-
countered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, 
the matter will be referred to the European Council’. 
 The CT has been ratified by 15 Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Spain, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Germany, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Italy and by two states 
which will join the EU in 2007 or 2008 – Bulgaria 
and Rumania. Thr CT has been rejected in two 
Member States: France and Holland. The ratifica-
tion process has not been completed in eight coun-
tries. Finland is planning to ratify through parliament 
soon. The ratification process has been suspended 
in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
 The Member States which have ratified the CT 
do not want to see it abandoned. They argue that the rat-
ification process should be completed in each EU country. 
The countries where the CT has been rejected declare 
that they will not renew the ratification process even 
though the results of parliamentary elections in Holland 
and presidential elections in France in 2007 could see 
a modification of this position. The Member States which 
have suspended the ratification process are faced with 
the decision to go ahead or to seek a European Council 
decision which would see the implementation of institu-
tional reforms in the EU by other means. 
 On May 10 the European Commission pre-
sented its political proposals on the future of the de-
bate on the CT after the close of the reflection period. 
The Commission suggests that work on the Treaty 
should resume in 2008. It also proposes the introduc-
tion of those reforms which are possible under present 
Treaty arrangements. These include an extension 
of those decisions which can be undertaken under 
a qualified majority and the preparation of a politi-
cal declaration by EU leaders for the 50th anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.
 Meanwhile the Commission of the Con ference 
of Bishops of the European Community stated on 
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May 5 2006 that the ‘debate on the future of Europe should 
concentrate on the Constitutional Treaty so as to facilitate 
ratification of the Treaty in all the Member States’. 
 In Poland the public political dialogue has, 
so far, seen little attention devoted to the future 
of the CT. The Foreign Ministry has said in reply 
to a parliamentary question that Poland does not aim 
to restart the ratification process in the immediate fu-
ture. At present several government committees have 
begun work on preparing an official position on the CT 
for the EU summit on June 16 and 17th 2006. President 
Lech Kaczyński has said that he is in favour of the prep-
aration of an entirely new Constitution.
 A series of conferences organised jointly 
by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) and the Polish 
Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in the first 
half of 2006 served as a platform for an exchange 
of views on what Polish society and the authorities 
should do in the current situation. These meetings 
served as a good starting point for further, essential de-
bates on the subject of institutional reforms in the EU 
in the country: in the government, in the political par-
ties and in civil society at large.
 Politicians from the government and opposi-
tion stated during our debates that the text of the CT 
is no longer an object of debate. “The CT in its present 
form is passé, it no longer exists and will not be revived. 
This doesn’t exclude a return to a serious civic discus-
sion with the participation of national representatives... 
but the issue should be discussed in a more sensible 
way, because the results of the last debate showed 
that the discussion till now has not been too intel-
ligent” (a politician from the ruling Law and Justice 
party). An opposition politician put it this way: “I am 
convinced that the safest option for Europeans who 
want Europe to be united should be to end the period 
of reflection once and for all. I mean that a resumption 
of reflection will mean a resumption of destruction. 
That is what I am afraid of. I will be frank I would like 
to see the period of reflection to die”. (a politician from 
the Civic Platform).
2. Possible scenarios:
 The present debate in Europe shows that there 
are at least four possible basic scenarios for the future.
The first scenario: „Standing by the Constitutional 
Treaty” – this involves a continuation of the ratifica-
tion process by the remaining Member States supple-
mented by a renewed ratification attempt by France 
and Holland in the wake of the introduction of any 
attachments such as annexes, declarations or protocols 
which are deemed to be necessary
 Advantages: The ratification of the CT in suc-
cessive Member States would provide a way out 
of the present impasse and open the way to fur-
ther enlargement. The continuation of the rat-
ification process would respect the decisions 
of the citizens of those countries which have 
taken a position on the CT.
 Threats: problems with repeating the refer-
enda in France and Holland and resistance 
to the CT in several Member States such as 
the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic or 
Poland which have yet to ratify could invali-
date this option. Were the CT to be rejected 
in further Member States pressure would grow 
for the creation of a ‘hard core’ based for exam-
ple on the euro group.
The second scenario: „a mini constitution” 
– this would involve the ‘stripping out’ of the CT 
of the main institutional reforms and their inclusion 
in a ‘mini constitution’ which would then be ratified 
by national parliaments.
 Advantages: The avoidance of ratification 
through referendum would increase the chanc-
es of implementing institutional reforms 
in comparison with the first scenario. The sec-
ond scenario opens the way to the introduction 
of institutional solutions which are beneficial 
to Poland without going through lengthy ne-
gotiations with EU partners. Were this sce-
nario to come to fruition then the rationale for 
a ‘hard core’ would disappear.
 Threats: It is not clear whether a transfer 
of key parts of the CT to a mini constitution 
would allow the reforms to retain their internal 
logic. This scenario risks drawing criticisms 
that democratic principles were being ignored 
by the avoidance of referenda. The issue 
of the double majority, which was criticised 
by Polish politicians would reappear, accom-
panied by a renewed defence of the system 
of weighted votes in the Council which is con-
tained in the Nice Treaty.
The third scenario: a continuation of reforms without 
the implementation of the CT – this scenario would 
see the essential institutional changes such as the sys-
tem of voting in the Council and the division of seats 
in EU institutions brought into the accession treaty 
with the 28th candidate state. This treaty would then 
be ratified by the parliaments of the Member States. 
Other reforms would be brought in through agreements 
between Member States on a non treaty basis.
 Advantages: This scenario opens the way 
to intergovernmental negotiations on several 
essential institutional reforms. It also smooths 
the way to further enlargement of the EU 
and to the strengthening or establishment 
of EU policies dealing, for example, with 
energy security, migration or defence also 
on the basis of ‘strengthened cooperation’. 
Changes which could be brought in without 
recourse to the CT would include an extension 
of qualified majority voting in certain fields, 
battle groups, the European Defence Agency, 
the fund for integration of citizens of third 
countries and a strengthening of OLAF.
 Threats: The extent to which reforms can be 
implemented on the basis of existing EU trea-
ties is limited. It has been pointed out that it is 
impossible to bring in changes such as the legal 
personality of the EU, which would open the way 
to the ratification by the Union of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Also an elimi-
nation of the pillar system involving solidarity 
in foreign affairs as well as in the area of free-
dom, security and justice would be difficult. 
The non democratic argument would also ap-
pear as critics would say that changes rejected 
by the citizens in referenda were being brought 
in by the back door. As in the first and second 
scenarios the problem of Poland accepting anew 
the double majority system would remain. 
The fourth scenario: the preparation and ratifica-
tion of a new constitution for the EU which would 
only in a limited way repeat the reforms contained 
in the present CT.
 Advantages: this would mean a new start 
with the full involvement of 27 Member 
States. The situation within the EU could 
stabilise in the time that it will take to prepare 
and agree the new treaty so that ratification 
will be easier.
 Threats: Negotiations over new solutions would 
last a long time with no certainty that a new 
compromise will be possible. In this scenario 
further enlargement of the EU will be sus-
pended until such agreement is reached. As 
in previous scenarios the problem of Poland’s 
renewed agreement to the principle of the dou-
ble majority, accepted in the CT by 25 Member 
States, remains.
3. Conclusions and recommendations for 
Poland.
 The renewal of the debate over the CT and the fur-
ther ratification of the CT by successive countries 
such as Belgium, Estonia and with Finland soon 
to follow shows that the CT is not dead. Official 
declarations to the effect that the CT is defunct 
would put Poland on the margin of European de-
bate and diminish our chances of shaping further 
institutional changes. 
 We should also firmly reject proposals aim-
ing at a rejection by the Polish parliament 
of the CT. It is not in Poland’s interest to join 
France and Holland and volountarily take 
on the odium of being one of those countries 
which put a brake on the integration process.
 Surveys of Polish public opinion consist-
ently show strong support for Poland’s mem-
bership of the EU. 68 per cent of Poles say 
that the European Union needs a constitution 
and 59 per cent think that the present CT ‘is 
necessary to improve the functioning of the EU’. 
Parliament elected in the elections of autumn 
2005 holds the opposite view. Only a national 
referendum would allow us to precisely de-
fine the views of Polish society in this respect. 
The results of such a referendum, irrespective 
of the turnout, should be binding on parliament 
 Poland should identify which of the CT reforms 
which could be introduced on the basis of the cur-
rent treaties, it is ready to accept. An example 
of such changes is the European Defence Agency 
which has already been established. The Finnish 
presidency in the second half of 2006 aims to open 
up the proceedings of the Council. Even though 
this is a CT provision it can be done under present 
treaties. It would also be useful to bring in other 
measures bolstering outside control over commu-
nity institutions such as a strengthening of the role 
of national parliaments in accordance with the pro-
visions of the CT. These and other measures not 
contained in the CT could bring about a growth 
in support for the EU among its citizens and help 
persuade public opinion that the EU is developing. 
 Participants in the debates organised jointly 
by the Institute of Public Affairs and the Polish 
Institute of International Affairs pointed 
to the possibility of immediate implementation 
of EU projects. These would be in the economic, 
foreign and internal security fields. However 
this needs political will. The European 
Commission is thinking along similar lines 
when it proposes initiatives in the field of jus-
tice and home affairs. The Commission calls 
the policy a ’Europe of results. Such a policy 
aims at increasing public support for necessary 
institutional changes. Poland should actively 
support such initiatives. Our country should also 
back proposals to extend qualified majority vot-
ing to the fields of justice and home affairs. We 
should support the establishment of a European 
consular service and also implement our exist-
ing commitments concerning such issues as 
the European Arrest Warrant which requires 
an amendment to our Constitution. 
 Polish support for institutional reforms brought 
in on the basis of existing treaties should not 
be seen as a rejection of the CT. As of now 
the Polish government is bound by the fact 
that the country signed the CT in Rome. 
At this stage Poland should declare itself 
to be open to a wide ranging debate on insti-
tutional reform without closing the way to any 
of the above described scenarios. 
 Independently of the scenario which will 
determine the fate of the CT, Poland will, 
sooner or later, face the problem of drop-
ping its support for the Nice voting formulas 
in the Council. It should be noted at this point 
that the implementation of the Treaty of Nice 
has shown that even though Poland has almost 
as many votes as Germany and the other ‘big’ 
Member States, it appears that the crucial cri-
terion in ‘winning’ decisions is not the number 
of votes an individual country has but the abil-
ity to build successful coalitions. 
 Thus Poland should view ‘Nice’ as a negotiat-
ing chip for further talks with its EU partners. 
This is especially true of Germany which will 
take over the EU presidency in the first half 
of 2007. In exchange for agreeing to the ‘double 
majority’ system Poland should look for the sup-
port of Germany and other Member States for 
further enlargement of the EU and for other 
Polish concerns relating to the ‘Eastern dimen-
sion’ or energy security. 
 A natural opportunity for bringing in institu-
tional reforms which require Treaty changes 
would be the enlargement of the EU to the 28th 
state which will in all probability be Croatia. 
It can be expected that Member States will want 
to reach a consensus on such changes before 
this takes place. Poland should be ready with its 
own demands before this eventuality occurs.
 The abandonment of Polish support for 
the system of weighting votes agreed at Nice 
would remove the main reason why Polish 
politicians opposed the CT. Fears that accept-
ance of the CT would lead to the transforma-
tion of the EU into a ‘super state’ have no 
basis in fact. Despite its title the CT remains 
an international treaty agreed between sover-
eign states and its ratification does not threat-
en our country’s sovereignty.
 The fact that proposals for the introduction 
of institutional reforms outside the CT con-
tinue to appear means that we must decide 
on which changes we would like to see adopted. 
We must remember though that whatever path 
for change is chosen the starting point will be 
the reforms agreed in the CT.
 Poland should currently concentrate on looking 
for allies among the Member States for its vision 
of ‘European Solidarity’. In this respect Polish 
policy should be governed by solidarity to its 
partners within the EU. A country’s attitude 
to the CT is seen by many as a test of its ap-
proach to the European project. Thus support for 
the CT would make credible Poland’s proposals 
for strengthening solidarity within the EU.
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